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• Developments in energy markets in recent years
have signiﬁcantly affected the pace of expansion
and inﬂation in the North American and, more
generally, in the world economy. The prices of
both crude oil and natural gas have surged since
1999, and California has experienced serious
shortages of electricity.
• However,theadverseeffectsontheworldeconomy
of recent energy market developments are likely to
be smaller than those arising from the oil-price
shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s. The post-
1999 increases in oil prices are, in real terms,
considerably less than those experienced in the
earlier period. The intensity of energy use in
Canada and in other industrial economies has also
declined markedly since the early 1980s.
• Canada’s merchandise trade surplus in energy
commodities and products (relative to GDP) has
risen substantially since the early 1980s. Monetary
policy is better anchored to avoid the inﬂationary
spillovers of higher energy prices on the rest of the
Canadian economy. As a result, the Canadian
economy is better positioned to beneﬁt from the
increase in real income arising from positive
terms-of-tradeeffectsassociatedwithhigherprices
for oil and natural gas.
• Since the autumn of 1999, most of the divergence
between the total CPI and core inflation in Canada
has been the result of these large increases in
energy prices. To date, however, the pass-through
of higher energy costs to the core CPI appears to
have been small, as have second-round effects on
wages and other prices.
his article examines the changing effects
of major energy-price shocks on overall
economic activity and inﬂation in Canada.
Large price increases for oil and natural gas
can affect economic activity in various ways, through
their effects on real incomes, costs, and uncertainty.
Over the longer term, persistent rises in these prices
can substantially alter the demand for and supply of
oil-based products and natural gas.
The World Oil Market
High price volatility has been a long-standing charac-
teristic of world oil markets, especially since the early
1970s. This volatility stems largely from the fact that
the short-term responsiveness of both the demand for
and the supply of oil and oil-based products to large
price changes is low, so that relatively modest changes
in the balance between demand and supply can result
in large price movements. For instance, the global
demand for oil is relatively insensitive to price move-
ments in the short run, partly because significant
demand responses often require modifications to
equipment that uses oil-based products.1 Private
sector oil producers typically operate at capacity,
limiting their ability to adjust supply in the short term.
Additions to supply generally require exploration and
development of new oil reserves and, occasionally,
construction of new infrastructure to deliver the oil to
market.
Some oil-exporting countries, most of which are
in OPEC, have been willing to operate below their
1.  The small short-term price elasticity of demand for oil and other forms of
energy is conﬁrmed by various time-series studies, such as the classic study
by Berndt and Wood (1975). In addition, large-scale energy models typically
assume a small short-term price elasticity, as in the National Modeling System
developed and maintained by the Ofﬁce of Integrated Analysis and Forecast-
ing of the United States Energy Information Administration (Energy Informa-
tion Administration 2001a).
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production capacity in order to inﬂuence prices
(Anderson 2000). In fact, OPEC has stated explicitly
that it wishes to have stable prices.2 Indeed, the series
of production adjustments by OPECmembers over the
past three years was intended to move the world price
of oil into a more stable and somewhat higher range.
However, oil prices are highly sensitive to ﬂuctuations
in demand and supply, and the unpredictability of
many of these demand and supply changes has made
it very difﬁcult for OPEC to achieve its price range
objective. Furthermore, structural changes in the oil
market since the mid-1980s have increased the volatil-
ity of prices (Lynch 2001). For instance, the amount of
surplus capacity in all parts of the world oil industry
(production, shipping, reﬁning, and distribution) has
diminished appreciably over this period. The stock-
to-sales ratio in the U.S. reﬁning industry has also
decreased markedly in recent years with greater use
of just-in-time systems of inventory management.
The demand for and supply of oil are clearly much
more sensitive to persistent changes in real oil prices
over the longer term than in the short run.3 For exam-
ple, the large oil-price shocks of the 1970s and early
1980s contributed to the overall reduction in the inten-
sity of energy use in Canada and other industrial
economies over the past 20 years. They encouraged
substitution away from oil-based products and
towards other fuels (Box 1) and helped stimulate the
development of oil supplies in non-OPEC countries.
This has resulted in a marked rise in the world output
share of non-OPEC countries other than the United
States (Table 1).
2.  See for instance a recent speech by the president of the OPEC Conference
(Khelil 2001).
3.  Cross-sectional empirical studies, such as Grifﬁn and Gregory (1976) and
Pindyck (1979), suggest a value of the long-run price elasticity of the demand
for energy (in absolute terms) close to 1.
Table 1
Share of World Petroleum Production
Country/ Region Per cent share





54.5 40.1 38.3 42.1
2.8 2.3 2.6 2.9
16.5 15.3 12.2 9.0
25.7 42.3 47.0 46.0
Source: United States Government, Energy Information Administration
p = preliminary
The North American Natural Gas
Market
Natural gas markets in North America operate in a
continental rather than a world context, owing chieﬂy
to the high costs of transporting natural gas to end-
users.4 Prices for natural gas in North America, like
those for crude oil, are also subject to considerable
variability, reﬂecting the sluggish response of both
supply and demand to price changes at the commod-
ity level. The response of demand to price changes at
the commodity level is small, partly because of regula-
tory delays in adjusting consumer prices and a some-
whatgreaterprevalenceoflong-termpricingcontracts
for end-users of gas than for users of oil products. The
low short-term price elasticity of supply stems mainly
from long lags in bringing new supplies—often found
in remote areas—to market. Once again, the long-term
price elasticities of supply and demand for natural gas
are considerably higher than the short-run elasticities.
Over the long term, use of natural gas has risen rela-
tive to that for other fuels because of its environmental
advantages and declines in the price of natural gas
relative to that of other fuels (until recently). These
advantages have led to the penetration of new markets
in North America.
Over half of Canada’s natural gas production is cur-
rently exported to the United States and accounts for
close to 15 per cent of U.S. consumption (Energy Infor-
mation Administration 2000). Exports of natural gas
accounted for nearly 2 per cent of Canada’s GDP (in
current dollars) in 2000.
 In general, the North American gas market has
become increasingly integrated as linkages between
the markets for natural gas, oil, and electricity grew,
including the use of natural gas in new electricity-gen-
eration projects, and markets for natural gas and elec-
tricity were deregulated. Natural gas prices at the
producer level in Canada were deregulated after 1985,
although distribution and transmission tariffs on nat-
ural gas shipments continue to be regulated (National
Energy Board 2000).
Selected Developments in World
Energy Markets since 1997
World oil prices have continued to be volatile in recent
years, mainly in response to ﬂuctuations in global
4.  Natural gas markets in North America may become affected by develop-
ments in the rest of world over the longer term, to the extent that the United
States becomes more dependent on imports of liqueﬁed natural gas.5 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
Box 1: The Changing Intensity of Energy Use in Canada
The energy price shocks of the 1970s and early
1980s led to energy-saving innovations and
changes in the composition of demand that have
contributed to subsequent, marked reductions in
energy intensity in most industrial countries (Inter-
national Monetary Fund 2000). In Canada, total
ﬁnal use of energy relative to real GDP fell by about
25 per cent between 1978 and 1999 (Chart 1).1 The
intensity of use of oil products declined much more
than that of other forms of energy over this period,
reﬂecting the substitution of cheaper forms of
energy for oil products. Indeed, the use of natural
gas (relative to output) fell by only about 10 per
cent during this period, while the intensity of use of
electricity remained little changed on balance. Per-
sonal consumption of motor fuels and energy for
residential needs, relative to the volume of total
consumer spending, declined by about 25 per cent
and 33 per cent, respectively, between 1978 and
1999 (Chart 2).2,3 The reduction in energy use per
unit of output was more muted in both the goods-
1. Final use of energy includes energy products consumed by non-energy
ﬁrms, governments, and households. It would exclude the use of energy
products for non-energy uses, such as petrochemical feedstocks.
2.  In the case of motor fuels, higher energy prices had also led to govern-
ment-mandated increases in the fuel efﬁciency of automobiles.
3.  The former Statistics Canada data on consumer spending, which val-
ued expenditures at 1992 prices, are used in Chart 2.
Chart 1
Total Final Use of Energy per Dollar of Real GDP
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producing and services-producing sectors, although
here again there was a very pronounced substitu-
tion away from petroleum products towards other
forms of energy.
Energy intensity has always been higher in Canada
than in the United States, partly because of climate
differences, larger distances between major centres,
and the availability of low-cost energy sources such
as hydroelectric power. In 1998, ﬁnal-use energy
intensity was estimated to be about 50 per cent
higher in Canada than in the United States, and the
energy-intensity gap had widened since the late
1970s.  In particular, the energy intensity of Can-
ada’s business sector is  much higher than that of
the U.S. business sector. This partly reﬂects differ-
ences in industrial structure, some of which could
be attributed to the availability of low-cost hydro-
electric power in Canada. Resource-based produc-
tion (including such manufacturing industries as
pulp and paper and metal smelting and reﬁning),
which is a particularly heavy user of energy,
accounts for a much larger share of aggregate out-
put here in Canada than in the United States. The
gap in energy intensity between the business sec-
tors of the two countries has widened somewhat in
recent years, partly owing to the increasing impor-
tance of high-technology activity (a low user of
energy compared with many industrial sectors) in
the U.S. economy.
Chart 2
Real Personal Consumption of Energy as a
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demand. The West Texas Intermediate benchmark
price fell by over 40 per cent between June 1997 and
December 1998, chieﬂy because of a sharp decline in
Asian demand and unusually mild winter weather
conditions in North America and Europe during
1997–98. In real terms, the price of oil was at an
extremely low level at the end of 1998 (Chart 1).5 Real
oil prices more than doubled between the end of 1998
and November 2000 as world demand recovered, fol-
lowing a rebound in activity in many of the Asian
economies and very robust economic growth in the
United States. Moreover, OPEC countries cut produc-
tion during 1999, while additions to supply in the
non-OPEC regions were relatively modest. Both of
these latter developments occurred in response to the
earlier period of very low prices. Since the autumn of
2000,crudepetroleumpriceshaveeasedsomewhat,as
the effects on the world supply-demand balance of
last year’s production increases by OPEC and a slow-
down in world economic growth have become more
evident.6 Even so, gasoline prices in the United States
surged in April and May of this year (Box 2), before
falling back in June and early July.
Natural gas prices in the North American market have
surged since early 2000. U.S. consumption of natural
gas, after a period of virtually no growth between
1996 and 1999, in part owing to unusually mild win-
ters, increased very strongly last year. This substantial
rise in demand reﬂected both strong economic growth
and a return to more normal weather conditions
(Energy Information Administration 2001b). In addi-
tion, natural gas consumption by electricity genera-
tors continued to grow considerably, in part the result
of the increasing use of this fuel in new generating
plants. At the same time, lower cash ﬂow in the North
American petroleum industry in 1998 following low
oil and natural gas prices had resulted in reduced
drilling and, therefore, limited the supply response in
2000. Spot prices for natural gas have eased somewhat
since early 2001, reﬂecting milder-than-usual weather
conditions in much of North America.
5.  The “real” price is calculated as the ratio of the U.S.-dollar price to the
chain-weighted U.S. GDP deﬂator, reﬂecting the fact that energy is used
broadly by both consumers and ﬁrms. The current-dollar oil price used for
the calculation of the real oil price in Chart 1 is the West Texas Intermediate
price at Cushing, Oklahoma. The current-dollar natural gas price used to cal-
culate the real natural gas price is an export unit value measure quoted by the
National Energy Board, which reﬂects movements in spot prices with a lag of
several months.
6.  More recently, OPEC announced cutbacks in production of close to 10 per
cent, which came into effect on 1 April 2001.
Despite the higher cost of crude oil over the past two
years, its price, in real terms, is still much lower than
the peaks experienced during the early 1980s. Much of
the rise in the real price of oil during 1999 could be
considered a return to the average level experienced
over the 1987–96 period. The subsequent increase
through 2000, while considerable, was still much less
than the net jump of about 170 per cent between the
end of 1973 and the end of 1982.
Despite the higher cost of crude oil
over the past two years, its price, in
real terms, is still much lower than
the peaks experienced during the
early 1980s.
The Effects of Increased Energy
Prices on Economic Activity
in Canada
In analyzing the effects of substantial increases in
energy prices on overall economic activity in Canada,
it is useful to distinguish between temporary and more
persistent price changes. Increases that are perceived
Chart 1
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to be long-lasting would be expected to have a signiﬁ-
cantly greater impact on the volume of purchases of
new energy-using equipment and on the supply deci-
sions of both energy and non-energy producers than
those that are perceived to be temporary.
It is also helpful to distinguish between the macroeco-
nomic and sectoral economic effects of a large energy
price increase (Box 3). The macroeconomic effects
would stem from such factors as changes in Canada’s
terms of trade, the demand for Canadian exports, and
an increase in the level of uncertainty felt by Canadian
households and ﬁrms.7 A large relative price change
will also have important sectoral and regional effects,
arising initially from changes in the distribution of
7.   The adjustment of Canadian real economic activity to large energy-price
movements will also be affected by the response of the real exchange rate.
Earlier empirical work undertaken at the Bank for the 1972–91 period indi-
cated that increases in real energy prices led to a real depreciation of the
Canadian dollar (Amano and van Norden 1995). Over that period, the posi-
tive effects of higher energy prices for energy exporters may have been more
than offset by negative effects on other sectors of the Canadian economy
(Lafrance and van Norden 1995). However, it is much less clear that energy-
price changes had much impact on the Canadian real exchange rate in the
1990s (Laidler and Aba 2001).
income between the users, producers, and owners of
the energy resources.
Macroeconomic effects
A large oil-price increase would ﬁrst result in a
substantial redistribution of real income from oil-
importing countries to oil-exporting countries, as the
terms of trade of oil importers decrease and the terms
of trade of oil exporters rise (terms-of-trade effect).8 For
example, the rise of nearly US$10 per barrel in the
price of oil between the third quarter of 1999 and the
end of 2000 is estimated to have reduced the aggregate
income of the developed countries by about 0.4 per cent,
other things equal.9 In contrast, Canada, currently a net
8. The real income effect may be ampliﬁed or dampened by the impact of the
oil-price change on the net ﬂow of proﬁts accruing on the stock of net direct
foreign investment in the global oil and gas industry. In 2000, Canada’s cumu-
lated direct investment in the energy and metallic minerals sectors of other
countries was about 25 per cent higher than the cumulated foreign direct
investment in Canada’s energy and metallic minerals sectors. Data for the
energy sector itself are unavailable. A further reservation regarding these
data is that they are recorded at book rather than market values.
9. This estimate is based on recent calculations published by the International
Monetary Fund (2000).
Box 2: The Recent Jump in Gasoline Prices
Gasoline prices surged in both the United States
and Canada in April and May of this year, even
though crude oil prices remained well below the
peak levels reached last autumn. A number of
factors have contributed to this recent volatility
in North American gasoline prices.
U.S. gasoline inventories were very low this spring,
partly because stocks of heating oil at the start of
the last heating season were down, and this led
reﬁneries to focus on producing heating oil last
winter (Energy Information Administration 2001c).
As well, the growing specialization of gasoline
products in the United States arising from environ-
mental  requirements in areas with air-quality prob-
lems has contributed to increasingly frequent price
surges in those regions. Finally, the U.S. reﬁning
industry is currently operating at very high levels.
All these developments have contributed to the
growing dependency of U.S. regional markets on
distant suppliers, with the result that it takes longer
to replenish stock levels in these markets, and any
large price increases in response to temporary
changes in demand or supply can be more persistent.
The early spring period is usually one of the tight-
est times of the year for U.S. gasoline markets, as
reﬁneries complete their usual maintenance pro-
grams in the face of rising seasonal demand.
Indeed, as gasoline production increased, prices
fell back in June and early July. Even so, continued
constraints on capacity and distribution raise the
risk of further volatility in prices in coming
months.8 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
exporter of oil, is estimated to have experienced a gain
in real income of about 0.4 per cent as a result of this
price increase.10 The increase of about 135 per cent in
natural gas prices between the third quarter of 1999
and the end of 2000 is estimated to have increased
Canada’s real income by about 1.4 per cent, while low-
ering that of the United States by some 0.15 per cent.
The additional net export revenues from oil and gas
could be expected to result in higher proﬁts for the
exporting ﬁrms. For the provincial governments that
own these resources, the result would be increased
royalties and income taxes, and the federal govern-
ment would receive higher corporate income taxes.
Households that own equity in oil and gas companies
would also beneﬁt from capital gains on this equity.
Canada’s exposure to gains and losses of real income
through ﬂuctuations in the price of energy commodi-
ties has increased since the early 1980s, because our
net trade surplus in energy commodities and prod-
ucts, relative to GDP, has risen considerably (Table 2).11
In particular, exports of natural gas have increased rel-
ative to GDP, following the development of new ﬁelds
10.  The estimate for Canada, based on 1999 data, takes account of the direct
effect of the oil-price increase on Canada’s merchandise trade balance.
11. For Canada, trade in energy commodities includes crude oil, natural gas,
coal, reﬁned petroleum products, and electricity. In the case of the United
States, all of these items are included except for electricity.
and the expansion of pipeline capacity (Dion 1999–
2000). On the other hand, the U.S. net deﬁcit in energy
commodities (as a percentage of total GDP) in 1999
was largely unchanged from that of the early 1970s.
Since most of Canada’s important trading partners are
net importers of oil, a large rise in oil prices could be
expected to lower demand for all of Canada’s exports
to the United States and other oil-importing countries
(foreign-demand effect). Since most of these countries
have substantially reduced their use of oil-based prod-
ucts (relative to GDP) since the early 1970s, this for-
eign-demand effect should be considerably smaller
than that for a similar-sized oil-price increase during
the 1970s. The impact on the demand for Canadian
goods and services of large increases in the price of oil
Table 2
Net Trade Balance in Energy Commodities
and Products
As a percentage of GDP
Country 1973 1981 1991 1999 2000
Canada
United States
0.5 0.6 1.1 2.0 3.3
-0.6 -2.5 -0.9 -0.7 -1.2
Sources: Statistics Canada, U.S. Department of Commerce (Bureau of
Economic Analysis)
Box 3:  The Effects of Changing Energy Prices on Aggregate
Economic Activity
• Terms-of-trade: Following an energy price
change, there is a redistribution of real income
between energy-exporting and energy-
importingcountries.Anadditionalreal-income
effect would arise from the net ﬂow of proﬁts
associated with each country’s share of the
cumulated net foreign direct investment in the
global energy industry.
• Foreign demand: Changes in world energy
prices have an impact on the aggregate
demand of a given country’s trading partners
and, hence, on the demand for its exportable
goods and services.
• Uncertainty: Large movements in energy
prices affect the conﬁdence of both households
and businesses, thus increasing the level of
uncertainty.
• Cost: Changing energy prices affect the costs of
non-energy producers and the real incomes of
households.
• Energy supply: Movements in energy prices
have both short- and long-term effects on
energy supplies.9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
or other energy commodities might also be affected by
factors other than changes in their real incomes. To the
extent that Canadian industry is more energy inten-
sive than its foreign competitors (Box 1), the costs of
and prices charged by Canadian ﬁrms would rise in
relation to those of foreign ﬁrms, adding to the down-
ward pressure on demand for Canadian goods and
services (a cost effect). As well, the demand for those
Canadian goods that use a relatively high amount of
energy would be adversely affected, a good example
being large, fuel-inefﬁcient motor vehicles.
Canada’s exposure to gains and losses
of real income through ﬂuctuations in
the price of energy commodities has
increased since the early 1980s,
because our net trade surplus in
energy commodities and products,
relative to GDP, has risen
considerably.
A large and persistent increase in oil prices might be
expected to result in a rise in economic uncertainty,
especially when the rise in price is not simply a
rebound from an earlier price decline (uncertainty
effect—Hamilton 2000). Households and ﬁrms might
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to assess whether the oil price increase
is temporary or permanent and would therefore
become less sure about both the long-term costs of
equipment that uses oil-based products or other forms
of energy and about the near-term outlook for the
economy as a whole. Reduced conﬁdence could lead
to a further decrease in aggregate demand through the
postponement of business investment and purchases
of many big-ticket consumer items.
The possible quantitative importance of this uncer-
tainty effect may help explain why several empirical
studies have found an asymmetry in the relationship
between oil-price changes and real GDP growth in the
United States. The size of the adverse impact on
aggregate output arising from oil-price increases
seems to have been larger (in absolute terms) than was
the positive effect on activity of comparable oil-price
reductions, while increases had not had as severe an
effect on GDP when the price increase was only a
recovery from an earlier decrease (Balke, Brown, and
Yücel 1999; Hamilton 2000).
It is important to recognize that it is quite difﬁcult to
quantify the net effect of higher oil and natural gas
prices on Canadian aggregate economic activity. The
terms-of-trade effect could be offset in whole or in
part by the effects on foreign demand, costs, and
uncertainty. As well, the degree of additional uncer-
tainty arising from such shocks is difﬁcult to predict,
as is the impact of variations in conﬁdence on the real
economy.
As previously noted, Canada’s real income is esti-
mated to have increased by about 1.8 per cent as a
direct result of improved terms of trade resulting from
the combination of a rise of US$10 per barrel in the
price of oil and an increase of 135 per cent in natural
gas prices. If the marginal propensity to spend on pri-
vate goods and services12 is assumed to be between
0.5 and 0.75 and the marginal propensity to import is
about 0.4,13 then the impact of the higher terms of
trade on Canadian real GDP might be an increase of
0.5 to 0.8 per cent over a horizon of one to two years
(other things being equal).
Estimates published by the IMF and the OECD suggest
that a persistent oil-price increase of about US$10 per
barrel could reduce real GDP in the United States by
between 0.2 and 0.6 per cent in the ﬁrst year of the
shock (Box 4). A lower bound for the impact of
reduced U.S. demand on Canadian real GDP could be
a decrease in a range between 0.1 and 0.3 per cent
(under the assumption that the elasticity of Canadian
GDP with respect to U.S. demand can be proxied by
Canadian exports to the United States as a share of
Canada’s real GDP).14 However, there is a signiﬁcant
risk that this elasticity might be as high as 1.0, since
Canadian exports to the United States are heavily con-
centrated in such postponable items as motor vehicles
and machinery and equipment. The range for the
foreign-demand effect on Canada’s real GDP could
therefore be between 0.1 and 0.6 per cent.
12.   The marginal propensity to spend is the ratio of the change in spending
to a change in income. Spending is deﬁned as ﬁnal domestic demand, exclud-
ing the government wage bill.
13.   The marginal propensity to import is proxied by imports (excluding
automotive products) as a share of spending. Imports of automotive products
are excluded because they are mainly affected by exports of automotive prod-
ucts.
14. The impact of the surge in natural gas prices on U.S. activity, based on the
earlier estimate of a real-income effect of only 0.15 per cent, would likely be
relatively small.10 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
The combined impact on Canada’s real GDP of both
the terms-of-trade and foreign-demand effects is thus
rather uncertain, ranging from a decrease of 0.1 per
cent to an increase of 0.7 per cent. Moreover, no
attempt has been made to quantify the size of either
the uncertainty or cost effects, both of which would be
negative. With this latter point in mind, the estimated
impact of the recent increases in oil and natural gas
prices on Canada’s real GDP is likely to be small and
positive.
Sectoral effects
Large price increases for either crude oil or natural gas
would also signiﬁcantly affect the costs of Canadian
non-oil and gas producers and the real incomes of
households (cost effect), resulting in a transfer of
income to Canadian producers of oil and natural gas.
The impact on rates of proﬁtability of higher costs for
oil or natural gas, while varying widely across indus-
tries, would be negative for most non-oil and gas
industries. The short-run impact on Canadian aggre-
gate economic activity of the cost effect would likely
be negative, on the assumption that oil and gas pro-
ducers would raise their investment spending more
gradually than other ﬁrms and households would
reduce their expenditures.15
If oil and gas producers expect these price increases to
be long-lasting, they are more likely to increase their
investmentspendingonexplorationanddevelopment
and, at the margin, to bring higher-cost oil reserves
15.  Part of the reduction in spending both by non-oil and gas producers and
households may well continue into the longer term.
Box 4: The Impact of Higher Oil Prices on Global Economic Activity
When macroeconomic models of the global econ-
omy are used to estimate the impact of persistent
increases in oil prices on world output, researchers
attempt to take account of the key short-term and
longer-term channels of inﬂuence on aggregate
demand and supply, as well as the potential effects
on inﬂation and ﬁnancial markets. In such exer-
cises, it is typically assumed that central banks in
the industrial countries continue to target core
inﬂation and that ﬁscal policy is passive (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund 2000).1 The results in the
adjacent table demonstrate that a large oil-price
increase would still represent a substantial adverse
shock to the world economy, although there is con-
siderable variation with regard to the estimated
short-run effects on activity in the industrial econo-
mies. For instance, a rise of US$10 per barrel could
cause a reduction in output in the industrial econo-
mies in the ﬁrst year of as little as 0.2 per cent or as
much as 0.4 per cent. It is also important to note
that a large oil-price increase would likely have a
considerably smaller adverse effect on world out-
put than would have been the case in the 1970s and
1. Oil-producing countries are usually assumed to only gradually adjust
their spending in response to their higher level of revenues.
early 1980s, owing to the reduced dependency of
these economies on oil products. For instance,
Brown (2000) suggests that the U.S. economy may
now be about half as sensitive to oil-price increases
as it was in the early 1980s.
Impact of a Permanent US$10 per Barrel
(or 50 per cent) Increase in the Price of Crude Oil
on Real Global GDP—Alternative Estimates
Percentage of GDP
















Sources: International Monetary Fund (2000) and Brown (2000).
The OECD estimates were taken from International Monetary
Fund (2000). Estimated effects of oil-price increases on real GDP
reported in these studies were for smaller increases than in the
above table. It was assumed for the purposes of this article that
the relationship between the oil-price increase (in US$ per
barrel) and the percentage change in real GDP was linear.
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into production (energy-supply effect). All the same, the
lag between a price rise and an increase in investment
spending (especially for conventional oil and gas drill-
ing) tends to be fairly short, since cash ﬂow is an
important determinant of capital spending in this
industry. For example, investment expenditures by
the oil and gas industry surged by over 25 per cent in
2000 as a result of higher oil and natural gas prices. A
further gain of more than 8 per cent is predicted for
this year, according to Statistics Canada’s latest survey
of investment intentions (Statistics Canada 2001).16
If and when households and ﬁrms become more conﬁ-
dent that the price increases for oil and natural gas
will persist, they will be more likely to purchase new,
more-energy-efﬁcient equipment. Over the longer
term, spending on oil and gas would therefore
decline. For example, consumers will tend to choose
durable goods that help to reduce their use of oil-
based products or natural gas. Businesses might also
be expected to conserve on their use of oil and natural
gas over the longer term. There might therefore be
substantial substitution of both labour and capital for
energy following a large oil-price increase, although it
may take many years for the full impact of these
energy-substitution effects to take place (Rasche and
Tatom 1977; Atkeson and Kehoe 1999). Finally, a sub-
stantial and persistent increase in the real price of
energy might reduce the economic value of much of
the existing stock of capital (Berndt 1984). If there is a
signiﬁcant and long-lasting decrease in the demand
for the output of energy- and capital-intensive indus-
tries because of the higher price of oil, then the eco-
nomic value of the associated capital stock might be
much lower. There does seem to be evidence from U.S.
data that such reallocative effects from past large oil-
price increases had important and persistent adverse
effects on economic activity in the United States,
because it took considerable time to correct the mis-
match between the actual and desired distribution of
labour and capital across sectors (Davis and Haltiwan-
ger 1999).
This suggests that large and long-lasting changes in
real energy prices can lead to signiﬁcant reallocations
of labour and capital across sectors. In particular, large
and persistent increases in oil and natural gas prices
16. This survey was conducted from October 2000 to the end of January 2001.
If the cash ﬂow of oil and gas ﬁrms turns out to be much stronger than
expected at the time of the survey, the results may well underestimate the
level of investment spending that will be undertaken by the industry this year.
could result in substantial increases in the production
of these commodities at the expense of marked reduc-
tions in manufacturing activity, other things being
equal.17 Nevertheless, aggregate output could still be
expected to be higher in the long run, given Canada’s
comparative advantage as a producer of these energy
commodities.
The Effects of Energy-Price Shocks
on the Price Level and on Inﬂation
A substantial part of the usual variation between the
12-month rate of change in Canada’s total consumer
price index and the change over the same period in
core inﬂation (the CPI excluding the eight most vola-
tile components and the effect of changes in indirect
taxes on the remaining CPI components) reﬂects ﬂuc-
tuations in the prices of energy commodities. Indeed,
the large increases in the prices of gasoline, fuel oil,
and natural gas at the consumer level largely explain
why CPI inﬂation in Canada has been well above core
inﬂation since the autumn of 1999.
The ﬁrst-round effects on the total CPIof large changes
in the price of crude oil, while still considerable, have
diminished since the early 1980s, in part because the
average consumer has cut down his/her use of gaso-
line and fuel oil. On the other hand, over this same
period, the weight of natural gas expenditures in total
consumer spending has, on balance, changed very little.
Large changes in the prices of energy commodities
could also have ﬁrst-round effects on certain other CPI
components, such as air and surface transportation,
which are highly energy-intensive. Increases in the
prices of oil and natural gas might also have signiﬁ-
cant second-round spillovers on wages and other
prices if the ﬁrst-round, cost-based effects on the total
CPI lead to a rise in the expected rate of inﬂation.
Following the very large oil-price shock of 1973–74,
therewasevidenceofsubstantialsecond-roundeffects
on wages and other prices in many industrial econo-
mies (International Monetary Fund 2000). Inﬂationary
pressures were already strong in the global economy,
the oil-price shock was extremely large in real terms,
and central banks in many countries effectively
accommodated much of the second-round effects on
wages and prices through their conduct of monetary
17.   Formal modelling of the effects of resource-price shocks on the major
sectors of the Canadian economy is provided in Stuber (1988) and Macklem
(1993).12 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
policy. Indeed, the interaction between the oil-price
shock, accommodative monetary policies, and relatively
inﬂexible labour markets was thought to have contrib-
uted to the sharp jump in unemployment in a number
of industrial economies through unsustainable levels
of real wages (Bruno and Sachs 1985).
The long lags in the pass-through of
higher energy costs to the core CPI
and the lack of signiﬁcant second-
round effects from the recent sharp
rise in energy prices on core inﬂation
in Canada and in other industrial
countries may be indicative of how
the low-inﬂation environment in
recent years has changed price-
setting behaviour.
The long lags in the pass-through of higher energy
costs to the core CPI and the lack of signiﬁcant second-
round effects from the recent sharp rise in energy
prices on core inﬂation in Canada and in other indus-
trial countries may be indicative of how the low-inﬂa-
tion environment in recent years has changed price-
setting behaviour.18 When a central bank’s commit-
ment to keeping inﬂation low over the medium term
is highly credible, ﬁrms may be less likely to pass on
higher costs to households by raising prices, at least
until they are fairly certain that the cost change will
last. Indeed, recent empirical evidence suggests that
the persistence of inﬂationary shocks has declined in
the low-inﬂation environment (Taylor 2000). Such
behaviour makes it less likely that large changes in the
prices of energy commodities will affect inﬂation
expectations and, therefore, the inﬂation rate over the
longer term.
18. The degree of pass-through of exchange rate changes to the core CPI also
appears to have diminished considerably in Canada and other industrial
countries in the 1990s (Bank of Canada 2000).
The ﬁrst-round effects on the core CPI of the substan-
tial rises in crude oil and natural gas prices since late
1999 are also estimated to have been small to date—
less than 0.1 per cent over the past year. Since the ini-
tial rise in crude oil prices through much of 1999 was
largely a recovery from abnormally low price levels in
the preceding year, the majority of ﬁrms would have
perceived energy costs through most of 1999 as rela-
tively normal.19 While the estimated long-run effect of
a permanent increase of 50 per cent in crude oil prices
(about the size of the change in oil prices between the
third quarter of 1999 and the end of 2000) on the core
CPI is estimated to be about 0.4 to 0.6 per cent,20 it
seems likely that such price changes will be spread
over several years. The presence of longer-term con-
tracts and credible monetary policy may have helped
slow down the pass-through of higher energy costs to
prices. If the recent high level of energy prices does
persist over the longer term, ﬁrms may be able to off-
set some of these higher energy costs through such
means as energy conservation.
In most industrial countries, there has been little evi-
dence that the recent sharp rise in energy prices has
had signiﬁcant second-round effects on wages and
other prices (International Monetary Fund 2000). In
Canada, second-round inﬂationary effects also appear
to have been limited to date. While the underlying
rate of growth in labour compensation rose in 2000, so
did productivity growth, at least in the ﬁrst half. The
year-over-year rise in unit labour costs in the business
sector remained moderate, at least until the end of last
year.21
19.   Since the downturn in crude oil prices during 1998 was short-lived, it is
likely that the subsequent temporary cost reductions were not passed into the
core CPI. As the energy-cost increases through most of 1999 represented only
a recovery to more normal levels, no cost-related core CPI adjustments would
have necessarily been needed.
20. The estimated long-run effect of a 50 per cent permanent rise in crude oil
prices on the core CPI is based on a simulation with Statistics Canada’s input-
output price model. These calculations assume that there is full pass-through
of the higher cost of crude oil into consumer prices and no substitution efforts
by either ﬁrms or consumers. The estimated effect on the former core CPI
would have been slightly smaller.
21.   Part of the increase in the year-over-year rise in unit labour costs in
Canada at the end of 2000 may have been the result of a cyclical slowdown
in the growth of labour productivity.13 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
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